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1 Introduction
Sports betting is a multi-billion dollar business. FIFA (2011) estimates that sports betting
generated between $350 billion and $400 billion in 2011 while the sports industry itself
generated around $300 billion. The dominant form of sports betting is bookmaker betting.
Bookmakers act as dealers by announcing the odds or point spreads that reflect the prices
against which bettors can place their bets. Thereby, bookmakers enter the opposite posi-
tion of each bet. As long as bettor preferences and perceptions are unbiased, bookmakers
do best by setting informationally efficient odds that reflect the true winning probability
of the underlying event. Otherwise, bookmakers can sustain large losses if bettors are
able to recognize and exploit the biased odds (Levitt, 2004). In the presence of senti-
mental bettors who prefer bets with particular characteristics and who do not necessarily
choose the bets with the highest expected return, optimal bookmaker pricing becomes
more complex. Popular examples of bettor sentiment include the optimistic/perception
bias (e.g., Kuypers, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Page, 2009) which causes bettors to overrate the
winning probability of certain teams, and the loyalty bias (e.g., Forrest & Simmons, 2008;
Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2011) which prevents bettors from betting against the team
they support. Bettor sentiment leads to an asymmetric volume demand even when the
bookmaker odds reflect the true winning probability of the underlying event.
This article tests whether and how bettor sentiment affects the pricing strategy of
bookmakers. Bookmakers can react to bettor sentiment and thus asymmetric volume
demand in three different ways: They can either lengthen or shorten the odds of the more
heavily demanded bet or they can refrain from price adjustments and set unbiased odds
that provide equal betting returns for all outcomes of the market. Kuypers (2000) and
Levitt (2004) argue that bookmakers can maximize their profits by shortening the odds
of the bet with the comparatively higher betting volume. Alternatively, the model of
Franck et al. (2011) shows that, given a highly elastic demand, risk-neutral bookmakers
could profit from lengthening the odds of the more heavily demanded bet. The reasoning
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behind this pricing strategy is that the lower but still positive margin on such bets is
overcompensated by a vast additional betting volume from price-sensitive bettors.
Empirical evidence on the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker odds is mixed.
Avery and Chevalier (1999), Levitt (2004), Paul and Weinbach (2007) and L. Woodland
and Woodland (1994) show that the bettor returns are abnormally low for bets with
higher bettor sentiment. Forrest and Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2011), however,
find higher returns for bets with high bettor sentiment. And while Braun and Kvasnicka
(2013) find both upward and downward biases, Page (2009) does not find any evidence
of biased odds due to bettor sentiment. Hence, the cumulative evidence on the effect of
bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing is weak and/or inconsistent.
One difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker pricing is
that actual betting volume data is often missing. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to use actual bookmaker betting volume data as an indicator of sentimental betting
to analyze the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing.1 The previous sentimental
preferences literature typically has only employed proxy measures for sentimental betting
demand such as the advice of experts, the historical success or prestige of teams (Avery
& Chevalier, 1999), the difference in mean home attendance between the two opposing
teams (Forrest & Simmons, 2008; Franck et al., 2011) or the number of bets placed in a
betting tournament with a fixed entry fee (Levitt, 2004).
A second difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker
pricing is that bettor sentiment is often correlated with other confounders such as bettor
risk or skewness preferences (Golec & Tamarkin, 1998; Quandt, 1986) and bookmaker
price adjustments due to the risk of the underlying event (Shin, 1991). Thus, empirical
patterns in betting markets such as the favorite-longshot bias, which refers to the finding
that the expected return of bets with a high winning probability tends to be systematically
higher than the return of bets with a low winning probability (see Sorensen & Ottaviani,
2008 for a survey), cannot be attributed solely to bettor sentiment.
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We investigate betting returns and volume percentages of the popular over/under 2.5
goals betting market on soccer matches.2 This market is beneficial for three reasons. First,
there are only two possible outcomes. An under 2.5 goals (hereafter under) bet wins if
the total score of the two teams is 2 or less and an over 2.5 goals (hereafter over) bet wins
if the total score is 3 or more. Second, the average score of a soccer match lies somewhere
between 2.4 and 2.6 goals, depending on the league and competition (Norman, 2011).
Thus, the empirical probability of winning is close to 50% for both the over bet and the
under bet, which indicates that potential risk considerations of bettors and bookmakers
are negligible. Third, the over/under 2.5 goals betting market allows us to exploit a
natural source of sentimental betting. Matches with a high number of total goals are
generally more attractive than matches with few or no goals (Paul & Weinbach, 2002;
B. Woodland & Woodland, 2010). As gambling is a consumption good, some bettors may
even be willing to sacrifice expected returns for the inherent entertainment value of the
bet (Conlisk, 1993). Cheering for an exciting high-scoring match is more attractive than
cheering for a dull low-scoring match and the entertainment value is therefore certainly
higher for the over 2.5 goals bet than for the under 2.5 goals bet. Hence, at least part of
the betting volume wagered on the over bet is expected to be sentimentally driven due to
this preference. All in all, our setting allows a clean and simple analysis of whether and
how bettor sentiment affects bookmaker pricing.
2 Data and Method
We use data on the volume percentages of money wagered on each side of the over/under
2.5 goals betting market. The betting volume data was provided by the bookmaker
Tipico, which is one of the leading sports betting vendors in Germany. In addition to the
online betting portal, Tipico has over 1000 betting shops in several European countries.
The original data sample included 4491 soccer matches played worldwide in 220 different
leagues and competitions between 1 November and 7 December 2011. The corresponding
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odds information was collected from the website oddsportal.com. 372 observations were
deleted because bookmaker odds could not be matched.3 Therefore, the final sample
consists of 4119 matches.
The website oddsportal.com publishes both opening and closing decimal odds offered
by Tipico and up to 62 other bookmakers. The opening odds are the first odds published
by a bookmaker, usually one to two weeks in advance, whereas the closing odds are the
last odds offered before the match starts. For the empirical analysis we use the closing
decimal odds. However, the main results would not change in any significant way if we
used the opening odds. For about 60% of all bets, the closing odds are the same as the
opening odds. Decimal odds denote the payoff of a successful bet. For example, if the
odds for an over bet are 2.50, a one dollar wager pays $2.50 if the total score is three or
more. We converted the decimal odds into prices, which are the reciprocal of the decimal
odds (e.g., 1/2.50 = 0.40). These prices indicate how much a bettor has to invest in order
to collect $1 in the event of a successful bet (Forrest & Simmons, 2008).
Figure 1a shows the distribution of the prices from over bets offered by the bookmaker
Tipico. The mean price is 0.54 and the prices appear to be fairly symmetrically distributed
around the mean. Figure 1b presents the corresponding distribution of the betting volume
percentages wagered on the over bet. This distribution is highly asymmetric, with a mean
of 0.82 and a skewness of -1.11. Thus, on average, about 80% of the betting volume is
concentrated on the over bet, leaving 20% of the betting volume for the under bet.
To test whether the bookmaker prices displayed in Figure 1a exhibit a systematic bias
due to the highly asymmetric volume distribution, we conduct simple t-tests for differences
in mean objective winning probabilities, betting volume percentages, prices, and bettor
returns on a one unit wager between over and under bets. By testing for differences in
the objective winning probabilities, we verify that one of the central characteristics of the
over/under 2.5 goals betting market, namely that the probability of winning is close to
50% for both the over and the under bet, also applies to our dataset. By comparing
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Figure 1: Distribution of bookmaker prices and betting volume percentages from over bets
differences in mean betting volume, we test whether the over/under 2.5 goals betting
market is indeed characterized by sentimental and thus asymmetric betting volumes. By
comparing mean prices and bettor returns we examine whether bookmaker pricing differs
between over and under 2.5 goals bets.
Because the betting volume is potentially endogenous to the bettor return, we estimate
a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model to identify the effect of sentimental betting volume
on bookmaker pricing. We use the over bet as an identifying instrumental indicator
variable to predict the betting volume in the first stage. The first stage regression is
specified as
volumeij = θ0 + θ1 · overij + vij (1)
where volumeij labels the betting volume percentage and overij refers to an indicator
variable equaling 1 for the over bet and 0 otherwise for each match i and betting contract
type j ∈ {over, under}. For each match i, we randomly select either the over or the under
bet to ensure independence across observations. The overij is a valid instrument because
it is highly correlated with the betting volume due to a general human preference for a
high score. Additionally, the bettor sentiment on the over bets is unrelated to potential
confounders such as the winning probability of the favorite team in a match. Hence, our
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instrument is unlikely to be correlated with the error term of the second stage regression.
The second stage is specified as
returnij = β0 + β1 · ̂volumeij + ij (2)
where returnij denotes the bettor’s return on a one unit wager calculated from the clos-
ing price offered by the bookmaker and ̂volumeij refers to the predicted betting volume
according to the first stage regression.
3 Results
Table 1 shows the results from two-sided t-tests for the differences in mean objective
winning probabilities (winning), betting volume percentages (volume), prices (price) and
bettor returns (return) between over and under bets. The average objective probability
Table 1: t-tests for differences in mean winning probabilities, volume, prices and returns
winning volume price return
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Std. Dev.
over 0.498 0.008 0.817 0.003 0.544 0.001 -0.086 0.015 0.942
under 0.502 0.008 0.183 0.003 0.539 0.001 -0.068 0.015 0.959
∆ -0.005 0.156 0.633*** 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.018 0.029
Notes: The table presents the results from a simple two-sided t-test for the difference in mean objec-
tive winning probabilities (winning), betting volume percentages (volume), prices (price) and returns
(return) between over and under bets. Additionally, the last column on the right hand side displays
the standard deviations of the returns. The number of observations for each test is 4119. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
for the over bet to win is 49.8% which is not significantly different from the average
probability of 50.2% for the under bet to win. By contrast, the betting volume is highly
concentrated on the over bet, accounting for 81.7% of the betting volume on average.
However, this highly asymmetric betting volume does not seem to affect bookmaker pricing
and bettor returns. The t-tests show that the differences in the mean prices and mean
returns are not statistically different between the over bet and the under bet.4 Non-
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parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank tests confirm these findings. Risk considerations of bettors
or bookmakers should not affect these results because the objective probability of the over
and the under bet to win is close to 50% (see first column of Table 1) and the standard
deviations of the returns are very similar (see last column of Table 1). The results of a
variance ratio test show that the standard deviations of the returns from over and under
bets are not statistically different.
The results from the 2SLS model are shown in Table 2. Column (1) reports the
estimates of the first stage regression, which predicts the betting volume. Our instrument
over is a strong predictor for the volume with a partial R2 of around 88%. Column (2)
reports the estimates of the second stage regression on the relation between the predicted
betting volume and bettor returns. The sentimental betting volume does not significantly
affect the returns. Thus, high sentimental betting volume does not cause abnormally high
or low bettor returns.5
Table 2: 2SLS regressions of returns
First stage: volume Second stage: return
(1) (2)
̂volume -0.038
(0.047)
over 0.633***
(0.005)
Partial R2 / R2 87.81% 0.67%
N 4119 4119
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 3166***
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates for closing prices and bettor returns. The betting volume is
instrumented by the over indicator variable. For each match, only one bet (either over or under) is
randomly included. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all
models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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4 Conclusion
We use actual betting volume data to analyze the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker
pricing in the over/under 2.5 goals betting market of soccer matches. This market offers
ideal conditions because bettors exhibit a natural preference for high match scores. At
the same time, the empirical winning probability for either bet to win is close to 50%,
indicating that potential risk considerations of bettors and bookmakers that could interfere
our results are negligible in this setting.
We find that the betting volume from the over/under market is highly concentrated
on the over bet, accounting for over 80% of the betting volume on average. However, this
imbalance is not associated with systematic sentimental biases in bookmaker pricing and
bettor returns.
Our results do not necessarily imply that bookmaker prices are always unbiased. If the
sentimental betting volume is positively correlated with the objective winning probability
of the underlying bet, bookmakers’ prices may still be biased. Forrest and Simmons (2008)
and Franck et al. (2011) find that bookmakers offer significantly more favorable prices for
bets on wins by strong teams with a large supporter base.
This article shows that in a setting where risk considerations of both bettors and
bookmakers are negligible, bookmakers do not distort their prices to exploit the bettor
preference to bet on a high number of goals in a soccer match. Instead, bookmakers offer
prices that reflect their best prediction of the true outcome probability and add an equally
distributed commission, even when bettor sentiment leads to a highly asymmetric volume
distribution.
One possible explanation for this finding is that bettors can easily compare the prices
listed by several different bookmakers and find the best prices through a number of web-
sites such as oddsportal.com or betbrain.com, which increases the bettors’ price sensitivity.
Thus, small price changes tend to have a large impact on the betting volume and even-
tually on the bookmaker’s profit. If a bookmaker increases the price (shortens the odds)
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of an over bet, sentimental bettors would switch to a competitor. On the other hand,
if a bookmaker lowers the price (lengthens the odds) of an over bet, he gains additional
sentimental betting volume, however, at a higher risk of substantial losses.
Notes
1Paul and Weinbach (2007, 2009) use data on the percentage of betting volume from Sportsbook.com
for the 2007 NFL and NCAA season, while other studies by Paul and Weinbach (e.g., 2008, 2012) use
data on the relative number of bets placed from four online sportsbooks (BetUS.com, CribSports.com,
SportBet.com and Sportsbook.com) provided by Sportsinsights.com. However, these studies mainly test
whether bookmakers attempt to balance their books in the point spread market. Furthermore, the relative
number of bets placed is an imprecise measure of betting volume because it ignores the size of the wagers.
We use data on the actual percentage of betting volume of a large European bookmaker.
2The over/under 2.5 goals betting market is the second largest market after the winner market on
home win, draw or away win according to the Betfair volume data on soccer matches from the 2011/12
season of the English Premier League provided by fracsoft.com.
3The betting volume does not significantly differ between matches with and without missing odds
information.
4This result is robust to the use of returns calculated from opening prices of Tipico and returns
calculated from prices offered by up to 62 different bookmakers including Bwin, Ladbrokes and William
Hill.
5Again, this finding is robust to the use of returns based on opening prices and returns based on
average bookmaker prices calculated from prices offered by up to 62 different bookmakers.
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